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Comity Versus Unitary Law: A Clash of Principles in 
Choice-of-Law Analysis for Class Certification 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Panel) transfers 
class action cases to a transferee court for pretrial purposes, a fundamen-
tal and potentially case-dispositive question arises: Which circuit’s law 
will the transferee court apply to the class certification determination?  
As described below, district courts are divided into two camps on this 
issue.  One camp, following the principle of comity, applies the transfe-
ror courts’ law.  The other camp, following the principle of unitary law, 
applies its own circuit’s law.  This Article describes the clash of prin-
ciples underlying these two approaches, explains why neither approach 
produces satisfactory results under the current multidistrict litigation sys-
tem, and presents a solution to end the division on this important choice-
of-law issue. 
Under the multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedure, the Panel as-
signs multiple federal lawsuits to a single district court (transferee court) 
for pretrial proceedings.1  The MDL assignment is technically for pretrial 
proceedings only, and unless the transferred cases are resolved during 
pretrial proceedings, the Panel must remand the cases back to the courts 
from which they were transferred (transferor courts) for trial.2  The 
choice-of-law issue for class certification is of paramount importance 
because there are several significant conflicts between the circuits’ case 
law.  Examples include critical issues such as the rigor with which courts 
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 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). 
 2. See id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
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examine experts’ opinions in connection with class certification,3 the 
availability of pursuing monetary relief under a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class,4 the possibility of using fluid 
recovery,5 and other issues that can make or break class certification.  
Thus, on a practical level, the law that applies to the class certification 
decision is a pivotal issue that can mean the difference between a multi-
million-dollar class action and an insignificant individual lawsuit worth 
as little as a few dollars. 
In the last few years, the transferee courts that have grappled with 
the choice-of-law question for class certification have resolved the issue 
differently; some courts applied the law of the transferor courts and some 
applied their own circuit’s law.  On a philosophical level, this divide 
represents a clash of fundamental legal principles: comity versus unitary 
law.  The principle of comity is the belief that courts should, under the 
proper circumstances, voluntarily defer to another jurisdiction’s laws.6  
The principle of unitary law is the belief that courts should adhere to a 
single, uniform law to foster consistency and efficiency.7  In the MDL 
class certification context, the principle of comity suggests that the trans-
feree court should apply the law of the transferor courts because the 
transferee court is merely handling the cases during the pretrial phase of 
the litigation and the cases must be remanded to the transferor courts for 
trial.  In contrast, the principle of unitary law suggests that the transferee 
court should apply its own law because there can be only one proper in-
terpretation of federal law and the transferee court is bound to follow its 
own circuit’s precedent. 
Under the current MDL procedure, which requires cases to be re-
manded for trial, both the comity approach and the unitary law approach 
have major intractable flaws.  As described below, strict adherence to the 
                                                 
 3. Compare In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00-MDL-1328 (PAM), 
2003 WL 244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003), and In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust 
Litig., No. 3:03-MDL-1556, 2007 WL 4150666, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007) (“[Rule 23] does 
not require—or authorize—the Court to credit Plaintiffs’ evidence over Defendants’ or vice versa.”), 
with In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that weigh-
ing conflicting expert opinion evidence and examining the persuasive value of such evidence is 
central to the class certification analysis under Rule 23). 
 4. See In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-
PAL, 2008 WL 3179315, at *5, *16 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008) (describing circuit split on this issue). 
 5. Compare McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(holding fluid recovery is unconstitutional in the class action context), with Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 
655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding fluid recovery is appropriate under some circumstances). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B. 
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comity approach is inefficient, can produce inconsistent results, and can 
require a district court to ignore its own circuit’s controlling precedent, 
even to the point of violating the Constitution of the United States.  Strict 
adherence to the unitary law approach, on the other hand, can significant-
ly impact the parties’ rights and, under certain circumstances, lead to in-
efficiency. 
This Article explores the choice-of-law quandary and its important 
role in MDL class action litigation, explains why the current approaches 
to the choice-of-law issue are ineffective, and offers a possible legislative 
solution.  Specifically, Part II describes the MDL process generally to 
provide a basis for discussion.  Part III describes the general choice-of-
law rules in MDL proceedings.  Part IV describes the case law address-
ing choice-of-law issues in MDL class certification proceedings.  Part V 
describes the major flaws that exist when applying the comity approach 
or the unitary law approach to the class certification decision.  Part VI 
offers a solution: Congress should change the MDL rules to eliminate the 
requirement of remand to the transferor courts, which will further consis-
tency in class action MDL cases, increase judicial efficiency, and elimi-
nate most of the problems district courts currently face in examining 
choice-of-law issues in MDL class action cases.  Part VII provides con-
cluding remarks. 
II.  THE MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PROCESS GENERALLY 
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact 
are pending in different districts, the Panel may transfer those actions to 
a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings un-
der the MDL process.8  This Part describes the circumstances under 
which the Panel will transfer cases filed in multiple districts to one dis-
trict for pretrial proceedings and explains the remand requirement for 
trial. 
                                                 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) provides: 
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in dif-
ferent districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings.  Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidi-
strict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such 
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just 
and efficient conduct of such actions.  Each action so transferred shall be remanded by 
the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from 
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, how-
ever, [t]hat the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party 
claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded. 
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A.  The MDL Transfer 
The district court to which the Panel transfers the actions is typical-
ly called the “transferee court,” and the district courts from which the 
cases are transferred are typically called the “transferor courts.”  The 
Panel will transfer the cases when it will serve the “convenience of par-
ties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such 
actions.”9  The MDL procedure aims to eliminate duplicative discovery, 
avoid conflicting rulings and schedules, reduce litigation costs, and con-
serve the time and effort of the parties, attorneys, witnesses, and courts.10 
The Panel determines where to transfer the actions.  Unrestricted by 
venue considerations, the Panel may transfer the actions to any federal 
district court.11  The Panel may consider a number of factors when de-
termining the transferee court, including whether (1) the parties prefer a 
particular district;12 (2) a particular district is geographically convenient 
and accessible to the litigants;13 (3) cases are already pending in a partic-
ular district;14 (4) a particular district court judge has already invested 
significant time in developing familiarity with the issues likely to arise in 
the actions;15 (5) a particular action was filed early or has advanced pro-
cedurally;16 (6) the evidence, parties, and witnesses are located in a par-
ticular district;17 (7) a potential transferee court has room on its docket;18 
                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.131 (2004). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 12. See, e.g., In re Rivastigamine Patent Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1362 (J.P.M.L. 2005) 
(choosing transferee district based on the agreement of the parties). 
 13. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1357 
(J.P.M.L. 2005) (consolidating ten California actions and four Delaware actions in the District of 
Delaware because, among other reasons, Delaware was a geographically convenient location for the 
litigants). 
 14. See, e.g., In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2006) 
(transferring cases to district court because, among other reasons, one of fourteen cases to be consol-
idated was already pending there). 
 15. See, e.g., In re American Invs. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 1361, 1362 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (transferring cases to judge who had “already developed fami-
liarity with the issues present in this docket as a result of presiding over motion practice and other 
pretrial proceedings in the actions pending before her for the past year”). 
 16. See, e.g., In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1351 (J.P.M.L. 
2006) (transferring to district where earlier filed and most procedurally advanced action was pend-
ing). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., MDL-1798, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94117, at *4 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 28, 2006) (transferring to District of Columbia where 
witnesses and documents were likely to be in or near the district). 
 18. See, e.g., In re Educ. Testing Serv. PLT 7-12 Test Scoring Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 
1365 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (transferring to district with “favorable caseload conditions”). 
2010] Comity Versus Unitary Law: A Clash of Principles 365 
and (8) a district has a judge experienced in handling multidistrict litiga-
tion.19  As described below, however, this transfer is for pretrial purposes 
only. 
B.  The MDL Remand Requirement 
Transferee courts make only pretrial decisions; the Panel must re-
mand the cases back to the transferor courts for trial.  The controlling 
authority on this issue is Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach.20  In that case, the Supreme Court held that a district court con-
ducting “pretrial proceedings” could not invoke the venue transfer sta-
tute21 to assign a case to itself for trial.22  The Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407’s use of the words “shall be remanded by the panel”23 as mandat-
ing the remand of the transferred cases back to the transferor courts for 
trial.24  Lexecon made clear that the Panel was obligated to remand any 
transferred case to its originating court when pretrial proceedings had 
concluded.25 
Lexecon is highly significant because it changed the landscape of 
MDL proceedings.  Prior to Lexecon, the vast majority of cases that en-
tered into the MDL process were transferred to the transferee court for all 
purposes, including trial.26  Transferee courts frequently transferred the 
cases to themselves under the Rules of Procedure set forth by the Panel.27  
That practice ground to a halt when the Supreme Court prohibited self-
transfer in Lexecon.28 
                                                 
 19. See, e.g., In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 
2006) (transferring cases to “a jurist who has the experience necessary to steer this litigation on a 
prudent course”). 
 20. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1996) (The venue transfer statute, provides: “For the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any 
other district or division where it might have been brought.”). 
 22. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40–41. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 24. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 35 (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(noting that prior to Lexecon, over two-thirds of the actions transferred pursuant to the MDL proce-
dure were not remanded to the transferor courts). 
 27. At the time of Lexecon, J.P.M.L. Rule of Procedure 14(b) provided: “Each transferred 
action that has not been terminated in the transferee court shall be remanded by the Panel to the 
transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or 
other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.”  J.P.M.L. R. of Proc. 14(b) (1998). 
 28. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 185, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (citing In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 
(SAS), M21-88, 2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005)) (noting that Lexecon has in-
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Interestingly, the Court did not pass judgment on the wisdom of 
§ 1407’s remand requirement.29  Indeed, the Court noted that it “may or 
may not be correct that permitting transferee courts to make self-
assignments would be more desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice 
of venue,” but found that a strict reading of § 1407 required the Panel to 
remand transferred actions back to the transferor courts for trial.30  Ulti-
mately, the Court concluded, if § 1407’s remand requirement was to be 
eliminated, “the proper venue for resolving that issue remains the floor of 
Congress.”31 
Notwithstanding Lexecon, most cases do not go to trial, and there-
fore the practical impact of MDL consolidation is that the transferee 
court usually decides the fate of the cases.32  For example, the transferee 
court may decide whether to strike a fatal blow to the cases through a 
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or class certification determina-
tion.  Alternatively, the transferee court may allow the cases to survive 
pretrial proceedings.  Given the magnitude of most cases consolidated 
under the MDL procedure, a transferee court’s decision on class certifi-
cation can mean the difference between a certified class action with po-
tentially millions, if not billions, of dollars at issue and an individual 
lawsuit worth an insignificant amount.33 
III.  CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY 
This Part examines the general choice-of-law issues in MDL pro-
ceedings.  Generally speaking, the choice-of-law case law breaks up 
nicely between state substantive law on the one hand and federal subs-
tantive and procedural law on the other.  As described below, this divi-
sion reflects a balance between respect for state law pluralism, in which 
our legal system embraces differences, and a desire for a unitary federal 
                                                                                                             
creased the number of remanded actions each year from several hundred to several thousand) [herei-
nafter MTBE II]. 
 29. Id. at 40. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. James C. Duff, 2008 Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Business of the United States 
Courts, Table S-20, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.  As of September 
30, 2008, out of the 301,255 total actions subjected to the MDL procedure, only 11,665 actions were 
remanded by the Panel.  Id. 
 33. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and ERISA Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Silicone Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (MDL No. 926); and In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007).  All three of these cases were class actions 
that settled for more than a billion dollars. 
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law, in which our legal system rejects inconsistencies and loss of effi-
ciency. 
A.  Choice-of-Law for State Law Claims 
A district court examining state law issues must use the choice-of-
law rules of the state in which the district court sits.34  In Van Dusen v. 
Barrack and Ferens v. John Deere Co., the United States Supreme Court 
held that when a case involving state law claims transfers from one dis-
trict court to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404,35 the transferee court 
must still follow the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transfe-
ror court sits.36  In other words, the transfer does not alter the choice-of-
law analysis.  In Van Dusen, the Court explained that “[a]lthough as a 
matter of federal policy a case may be transferred to a more convenient 
part of the system . . . [t]he case should remain as it was in all respects 
but location.”37  A “change of venue . . . generally should be, with re-
spect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.”38 
Courts have consistently applied this holding to transfers taking 
place under the MDL procedure.39  Thus, when analyzing issues of state 
law in MDL proceedings, the transferee court must apply the choice-of-
law rules of the state or states in which the transferor courts sit (for ex-
ample, the District of Kansas would apply California choice-of-law rules 
in analyzing a negligence claim for a case transferred from the Northern 
District of California).  The result of this rule can be a complicated ex-
amination of multiple states’ choice-of-law rules, because each action 
that originated in a different state will require a unique choice-of-law 
analysis.  In one MDL action, for example, a transferee court applied the 
choice-of-law rules of the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.40 
                                                 
 34. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
 35. See supra note 21, and text accompanying the footnote. 
 36. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 
U.S. 516, 531 (1990). 
 37. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 633. 
 38. Id. at 639. 
 39. See, e.g., In re United States Office Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d 58, 68 (D.D.C. 
2003); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, 257 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re 
ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2003); McCord v. Minn. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186–87 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 40. In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, 559 F. Supp. 333, 340–41 (D.D.C. 1983). 
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B.  Choice-of-Law for Federal Legal Issues 
The choice-of-law analysis is different for federal legal issues in 
cases that are transferred from one district court to another.  Generally, 
the circuit courts have held that the law of the transferee court’s circuit 
applies to federal legal claims.41  The seminal case on this issue is In re 
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, which was decided in 
the District of Columbia Circuit.42  In that case, the court addressed the 
question of whether the law of the transferee or the transferor forum ap-
plied to the interpretation of the federal Warsaw Convention/Montreal 
Agreement.43  The court refused to extend the rationale of Van Dusen v. 
Barrack to federal law, holding instead that the law of the transferee fo-
rum governs the determination of federal claims.44  Accordingly, the 
transferee court is under no obligation to defer to the interpretation of the 
transferor circuit when dealing with federal law issues.45  In reaching the 
conclusion that the transferee court’s law applied, then-Circuit Court 
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited the dual goals of uniformity in federal 
law and judicial efficiency: 
Application of Van Dusen in the matter before us, we emphasize, 
would not produce uniformity.  There would be one interpretation 
of federal law for the cases initially filed in districts within the 
Second Circuit, and an opposing interpretation for cases filed else-
where.  Applying divergent interpretations of the governing federal 
law to plaintiffs, depending solely upon where they initially filed 
suit, would surely reduce the efficiencies achievable through con-
                                                 
 41. This view has been embodied by the decisions of the District of Columbia, Second, Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.  Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 966 (11th Cir. 
2000); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998); In re Temporomandibular 
Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 
1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993); Eckstein v. Balcor 
Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994); In re Korean 
Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).  It should be noted that 
there is a circuit split on the issue of whether the transferor or transferee choice-of-law rules should 
apply when a case has been transferred and Congress has expressed its intention that the federal rules 
should not be interpreted in a geographically uniform fashion.  Compare Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 40 
(holding that Van Dusen and Ferens apply only in diversity cases), with Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1127 
(“[W]hen the law of the United States is geographically non-uniform, a transferee court should use 
the rule of the transferor forum in order to implement the central conclusion of Van Dusen and Fe-
rens: that a transfer under § 1404(a) accomplishes ‘but a change of courtrooms.’”). 
 42. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 43. Id. at 1172, 1174. 
 44. Id. at 1175–76. 
 45. Id. at 1172, 1174. 
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solidated preparatory proceedings.  Indeed, because there is ulti-
mately a single proper interpretation of federal law, the attempt to 
ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations simultaneously is 
inherently self-contradictory.46 
In contrast to analyzing issues of state law, which is anticipated to 
present and require the application of laws that may differ from state to 
state, “the federal courts comprise a single system [in which each court 
endeavors to apply] a single body of law.”47  Therefore, the Korean Air 
Lines court reasoned, “it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to 
apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is 
supposed to be a unitary federal law.”48 
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that the choice-of-law rules of 
the state in which the case was originally filed govern the choice-of-law 
analysis for state law substantive law issues even if the case is transferred 
to another district.  This is because, for state law purposes, a transfer is 
but a change of courtrooms that should not impact the substantive law at 
issue.49  This reasoning reflects deference to legal pluralism in state law 
issues and an acknowledgement that one party should not benefit over 
another because of a change in venue to another district.50  In contrast, 
courts that examine federal choice-of-law issues in the MDL context 
have applied the law of the transferee circuit because federal law is sup-
posed to be unitary and consistent, not pluralistic.51  The federal courts 
that consider federal choice-of-law issues do not seem troubled by the 
fact that application of the transferee courts’ precedent to a federal legal 
issue may benefit one party over another simply because of a change in 
venue. 
IV.  CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS 
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
The choice-of-law issues discussed in Part III above divide neatly 
along state and federal law lines, with the former requiring the state law 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 1175 (interpreting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)).  While the court 
noted that the law of the transferor forum “merits close consideration,” it determined that the transfe-
ror forum’s law “does not have stare decisis effect in a transferee forum situated in another circuit.”  
Id. at 1176. 
 47. Id. (quoting H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 
372 U.S. 928 (1963)). 
 48. Id. at 1175–76. 
 49. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See discussion, supra note 41. 
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of the transferor jurisdiction and the latter requiring the federal law of the 
transferee jurisdiction.  One might intuitively think that federal class ac-
tion certification determinations would necessarily follow the transferee 
jurisdiction’s law.  After all, class certification is governed by Rule 23,52 
which is a federal procedural law.  The case law, however, is split on this 
issue. 
As described below in Part IV.A, one camp has applied the law of 
the transferor courts.  Courts falling into this camp reason that Korean 
Air Lines and its progeny, which use the transferee court’s law for feder-
al issues, do not apply to class certification because class certification is 
an issue that impacts both pretrial and trial proceedings.  Because the 
                                                 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) provide: 
(a) Prerequisites. 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would 
create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class 
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a 
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that ap-
ply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding dec-
laratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently ad-
judicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready begun by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; and 
 (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
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cases will be transferred to the transferor courts for trial as required by 
Lexecon, courts that follow the principle of comity reason that the trans-
feror courts’ precedent must apply to the class certification decision. 
Another camp has applied the law of the transferee court, reasoning 
that Korean Air Lines and its progeny do apply to class certification.  As 
described in Part IV.B below, these courts, influenced by the principle of 
unitary law, reason that there is only one proper interpretation of federal 
law, and therefore each district court must interpret Rule 23 consistent 
with the precedent of its own circuit.  These cases also stress that apply-
ing one circuit’s law to the class certification determination is efficient 
because a district court need not use multiple circuits’ precedent in mak-
ing class certification determinations.53  The discussion below describes 
the division between these two competing camps and the clash of prin-
ciples these cases reflect. 
A.  The Comity Approach 
“Comity” is an informal practice where a court gives “mutual rec-
ognition” to another court’s judicial acts.54  Ulrich Huber, a Dutch jurist 
from the 17th Century, is generally regarded as the father of the principle 
of comity in the legal context.55  In his work, De Conflictu Legum, Huber 
explained that “‘[c]omity calls on states to recognize and enforce rights 
created by other states, provided that such recognition does not prejudice 
the state or its subjects.”56 
The U.S. legal system has embraced this principle and it can arise 
in many contexts.57  For example, in the international law context, the 
                                                 
 53. This does not mean, however, that the district court need only use one state’s substantive 
law.  An MDL action may involve numerous state law claims, each of which must be analyzed under 
the choice-of-law rules of each state at issue.  See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.  The only efficiency 
achieved with the unitary law approach is derived from using one circuit’s precedent on Rule 23. 
 54. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004). 
 55. Ulrich Huber’s work De Conflictu Legum was a landmark in the development of choice-of-
law theory.  GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: 
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 547 (3d ed. 1996); D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber’s 
Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 49 (1937); Arthur 
Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 189 (1942); Hessel R. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966). 
 56. Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, Praelectiones Juris Romani et Hodierni (1689).  For an 
English translation, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136 (1947). 
 57. Justice Story has been credited as the most important factor in injecting Huber’s conception 
of comity into United States jurisprudence.  See BORN, supra note 55; Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’s 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws—One Hundred After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1934); Kurt H. 
 
372 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:2 
United States may give legal effect to a foreign nation’s legal decision.58  
Comity may also arise when federal courts abstain from deciding a state 
legal issue that has not yet been addressed by a state court on the theory 
that the states should have the ability to govern their affairs without un-
necessary federal intrusion.59 
Within the MDL context, comity arises in connection with choice-
of-law analysis for class certification.  The case that best embodies the 
impact of this principle is In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products 
Liability Litigation (“MTBE I”).60  In MTBE I, plaintiff residents and 
property owners brought state law claims (e.g., nuisance, trespass, negli-
gence, and strict liability) in state courts against oil and pipeline compa-
nies for damages arising from gasoline release.61  The cases were re-
moved to federal district courts, and the Panel transferred the cases to the 
Southern District of New York under the MDL procedure.62  In address-
ing class certification, the MTBE I court considered whether the law of 
the transferor court (Seventh Circuit) or the law of its own circuit 
                                                                                                             
Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 230 (1961). 
 58. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (laying the framework for comity considerations 
in international law cases); see also Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 
713–16 (1987). 
 59. Brockett v. Spokane Arcade, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985).  The Supreme Court 
has long recognized that concerns for comity and federalism may require federal courts to 
abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the interpreta-
tion of state law. . . .  [W]here uncertain questions of state law must be resolved before a 
federal constitutional question can be decided, federal courts should abstain [from reach-
ing a decision on federal issues] until a state court has addressed the state questions. 
Id.  Similarly, based on the underlying principle of comity, the Supreme Court has generally refused 
to allow federal courts to intervene in pending cases in state courts.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37 (1971), noting that “comity” requires 
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is 
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that 
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to 
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.  This, perhaps, for lack of a better 
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one famil-
iar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is 
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our Federalism.” 
Id. at 44. 
 60. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
[hereinafter MTBE I]. 
 61. Id. at 437–38. 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). 
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(Second Circuit) applied to the Rule 23 analysis.63  The court found that 
the transferor court’s law applied.64 
The MTBE I decision largely turned on the distinction between pre-
trial and trial proceedings, the nature of class certification, and the Su-
preme Court’s Lexecon65 decision, which, as discussed above, held that 
the Panel is obligated to remand any transferred cases back to the transfe-
ror courts for trial.  The court explained that class certification is not only 
a pre-trial issue: class certification requirements are “inherently en-
meshed” with trial considerations because the trial court will need to ex-
amine the facts and law raised by the class claims.66  Further, under Su-
preme Court precedent, “courts must determine whether Rule 23 is satis-
fied for purposes of trial before granting certification.”67  Given Lex-
econ’s holding that § 1407 requires cases to remand to the transferor 
courts for trial, the transferee court’s authority ends once the pretrial pro-
ceedings are completed.68  Accordingly, the MTBE I court reasoned, “[i]t 
would be neither just nor efficient to apply the law of this Circuit in con-
sidering class certification, and then force the transferor court to try a 
class action that it might never have certified.”69  Thus, the court applied 
the law of the transferor court in examining class certification.70 
                                                 
 63. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 439–41. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,  523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998); see infra 
Part I.B. 
 66. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. 435, 440–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  The court, in holding that class certifi-
cation was not only a pre-trial issue, stated that the requirements of class certification were “inhe-
rently enmeshed” with considerations of the trial in requiring analysis of “the factual and legal issues 
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.”  Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 469 (1978)).  In a subsequent decision, the same court addressed this choice-of-law issue once 
again and decided that the transferor court’s law applies to class certification in MDL actions.  See 
MTBE II, 241 F.R.D. 185, 191–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Because this decision is consistent with 
MTBE I and does not offer any additional material insights into the choice-of-law decision, this 
Article focuses on the MTBE I decision. 
 67. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 440 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–
28 (1997)). 
 68. Id. (citing Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40). 
 69. Id. 
 70. The MTBE I decision noted that another reason to apply the transferor court’s law to the 
class certification decision was that the plaintiffs had initially filed their state law tort claims in state 
court and later had the claims removed to federal court.  Id. at 440–41.  The court reasoned that 
“[n]either party should be prejudiced in preparing for trial because the case was removed and trans-
ferred to another district in a different circuit.”  Id. at 441.  The court’s focus on the fact that the 
cases involved removed state law claims makes little sense.  While it is true that the district court 
may need to examine the elements of state substantive law in conducting its class certification analy-
sis under Rule 23, it does not follow that the class certification analysis is an issue of state substan-
tive law.  The class certification determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is a federal 
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More recently, the District of Nevada also concluded that the law of 
the transferor courts governs class certification in MDL proceedings.71  
In re Wal-Mart Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation was an 
MDL action involving approximately thirty-four wage-and-hour class 
actions brought against Wal-Mart in federal courts throughout the United 
States.72  The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify state-wide classes en-
compassing state law claims in four of the thirty-four cases involving 
three different federal circuits (the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).73  
In analyzing class certification, the Wal-Mart court acknowledged that 
potential choice-of-law issues and conflicts existed.74  The court general-
ly applied the transferee circuit’s law, noting that “the law relating to 
class certification is fairly consistent within all three circuits.”75  “To the 
extent the law[s] of the Third and Eighth Circuits diverge,” however, the 
court stated that it would “consider [the divergence] to determine wheth-
er any difference in the law of the respective transferor circuits would 
affect the outcome of the issue of class certification.”76  The court then 
analyzed the divergent standards regarding whether injunctive relief pre-
dominates for Rule 23(b)(2) purposes, because “[t]his [was] one area 
where the law of the Circuits at issue may diverge.”77  The court ulti-
                                                                                                             
procedural issue.  Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990).  If it were true that 
a court must apply the transferor courts’ laws whenever it would need to examine state substantive 
law as part of carrying out its analyses under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then the court 
would need to apply the transferor courts’ laws for any motion to dismiss under Rule 12 or summary 
judgment under Rule 56 for state law claims.  But such a result would not only be inconsistent with 
the Korean Air Lines line of cases, supra Part III.B., but it would also be at odds with the MTBE 
cases because the court had previously decided that it was bound by the law of the transferee court 
in deciding a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state tort claims.  In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M21-88, 2005 WL 106936, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 
2005).  Moreover, this division of state-versus-federal claims would make little sense in a case that 
raised both state and federal claims because the court would have to apply the transferor court’s Rule 
23 precedent to some claims and the transferee court’s Rule 23 precedent to other claims, which 
would be an absurd result.  Thus, it is clear that the lynchpin of the MTBE I decision is not that state 
law claims were at issue, but rather that § 1407(a), per Lexecon, requires the Panel to remand the 
cases to the transferor courts for trial, and the fact that class certification is a pre-trial and a trial 
issue.  MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 440–41. 
 71. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-
PAL, 2008 WL 3179315 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at *5. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  The court largely applied Ninth Circuit law, which was both the transferee circuit’s law 
and one of the transferor circuit’s law. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at *16. 
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mately concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden “[u]nder any 
Circuit’s test.”78 
In sum, the principle of comity influenced these courts to defer to 
the laws of the transferor courts in examining class certification.  MTBE 
I, in particular, focused on the fact that the transferee court is merely 
handling the cases for pretrial proceedings and the Panel will remand the 
cases back to the transferor courts for trial.  As explained below, this 
comity approach has been criticized and rejected by other courts that 
hold the principle of unitary law in higher esteem. 
B.  The Unitary Law Approach 
The concept of unitary law in the federal law context is straightfor-
ward; the principle provides that there is only one body of federal law 
and “there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law.”79  
Within the transfer context, the Korean Air Lines case best embodies the 
principle of unitary law.80  Unlike the state law system, in which differ-
ences are accepted as an embodiment of our valuable federalism, incon-
sistent interpretations of federal law among the federal courts is cause for 
concern81 and may lead the United States Supreme Court to grant certi-
orari to eliminate incongruity.82  At its core, the principle of unitary law 
has considerations of consistency and efficiency in mind.83 
The principle of unitary law has motivated some courts to apply the 
law of the transferee court in class certification determinations in MDL 
cases.  Currently, the most important case on this topic is the Central 
                                                 
 78. Id.  The court did not explain why it needed to examine the precedent of the transferor 
courts, though it presumably did so because it was persuaded by Wal-Mart’s class certification brief-
ing, which, largely based on the MTBE I case, argued that the transferee court should defer to the 
transferor courts’ laws for the class certification analysis. 
 79. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 80. Id. at 1174–76.  See also discussion supra Part III.B. 
 81. Id. at 1175 (“Our system contemplates differences between different states’ laws; thus a 
multidistrict judge asked to apply divergent state positions on a point of law would face a coherent, 
if sometimes difficult, task.  But it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simulta-
neously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal law.”). 
 82. SUP. CT. R. 10 provides, in pertinent part: 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.  A peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.  The following, 
although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the cha-
racter of the reasons the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered 
a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the 
same important matter. . . . 
 83. Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175. 
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District of California’s decision in In re Live Concert Antitrust Litiga-
tion.84  The court in Live Concert held that the transferee court’s law ap-
plies to class certification determinations in the MDL context.85  The 
Live Concert court noted that “circuit and district courts, including the 
Ninth Circuit, have uniformly applied the law of the transferee circuit in 
MDL proceedings involving federal law.”86  In particular, the court fo-
cused on the reasoning in Korean Air Lines, and decided that it would 
give transferor circuit precedent “close consideration,”87 but was bound 
to follow only the precedent of its own circuit and the Supreme Court.88 
The court determined that there were many reasons to apply the law 
of the transferee court, including the “reduction in efficiency of forcing a 
court to apply divergent interpretations of governing federal law and the 
logical inconsistency of requiring one judge to apply simultaneously dif-
ferent and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary 
federal law.”89  The Live Concert court also found support for its deci-
sion in the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Quoting Korean Air Lines, the Live 
Concert court reasoned that its interpretation of federal law would have 
binding force upon the cases’ return to the transferor courts, “for if it did 
not, transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 could be counterproductive, i.e., 
capable of generating rather than reducing the duplication and protrac-
tion Congress sought to check.”90  Thus, according to the Live Concert 
court, the transferor courts would effectively be precluded from relitigat-
ing this issue upon remand by the law-of-the-case doctrine.91 
Similarly, the District of New Jersey’s decision in In re Manageri-
al, Professional & Technical Employees supports the conclusion that the 
                                                 
 84. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 85. Id. at 104–05. 
 86. The court cited to numerous cases addressing choice-of-law issues.  Id. at 105 n.8. 
 87. Id. at 105.  The Live Concert court’s statement that it would give “close consideration” to 
the transferor court’s law is both significant and puzzling.  It is significant because it is an express 
acknowledgement of the desire for comity, otherwise there would be no reason to even consider 
what a transferor jurisdiction might do when considering class certification.  However, the statement 
is also puzzling because it is not clear why the court would need to consider the transferor court’s 
law if it will be trumped by the transferee court’s law in any event.  The court’s statement is further 
puzzling because it did not engage in any analysis of the transferor court’s law. 
 88. Id. at 104. 
 89. Id. (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1173–
1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  This reasoning is contrary to MTBE I.  Live Concert explicitly rejected the 
MTBE I court’s reasoning that “it would be neither just nor efficient to apply the law of this Circuit 
in considering class certification, and then force the transferor court to try a class action that it might 
never have certified.”  Id. at 105 n.8 (quoting MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. at 193). 
 90. Id. at 105 n.8 (quoting Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176). 
 91. Id. 
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transferee court’s law governs Rule 23 determinations in MDL cases.92  
In that MDL proceeding, employees of major U.S. oil companies alleged 
that the companies violated the Sherman Act by exchanging detailed sal-
ary information which slowed the rate of salary increases.93  The lawsuits 
were filed in federal courts in New York, Texas, and New Jersey and 
were consolidated before the District of New Jersey under the MDL pro-
cedure.  In analyzing class certification, the court noted that it “must first 
determine whether to apply the law of the Third Circuit or, if different, 
the law of the circuit from which each of the consolidated cases origi-
nated.  Where the claim arises under federal law, as is the case here, the 
appropriate course is to apply the law of the transferee court.”94  The 
court noted that applying the transferor court’s law had some appeal be-
cause “the pretrial nature of multidistrict transfers suggests that the law 
of the origin circuit should apply,” but ultimately relied on the principle 
of unitary law espoused in Korean Air Lines and decided that “the trans-
feree court [should] be free to decide a federal claim in the manner it 
views as correct without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor 
circuit.”95 
In sum, there is a sharp division between the courts that apply the 
transferor court’s law and the courts that apply the transferee court’s law 
in class certification determinations in MDL actions.  The former follows 
                                                 
 92. In re Managerial, Professional & Technical Employees, No. 02-CV-2924 (GEB), 2006 WL 
38937, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2006). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *2. 
 95. Id. (quoting Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174–76 and Richard L. Marcus, Conflict 
Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 721 (1984)).  
Other courts have supported the conclusion that class certification should be decided under the trans-
feree court’s laws.  The Western District of Oklahoma, in In re General Motors Corporation “Piston 
Slap” Products Liability Litigation, addressed the application of transferee versus transferor circuit 
law in determining the propriety of class certification under Rule 23.  MDL No. 04-1600, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26603, at *2 n.6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2006).  This case only briefly touched upon the 
issue, but the court’s preference for the law of the transferee circuit was clear: “Although this pro-
ceeding involves multiple cases transferred to this Court under the MDL procedure, in analyzing 
questions of federal law a transferee court applies the law of the circuit in which it is located.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the court applied the precedent of the circuit in which it was located in interpreting the 
standard for class certification under Rule 23.  See id.  Similarly, in In re Farmers Insurance Ex-
change Claims Representatives’ Overtime Pay Litigation, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1031 at n.12 (D. 
Or. 2003), the District of Oregon noted the preference for applying the law of the transferee circuit 
in a federal MDL proceeding, relying upon its own Ninth Circuit precedent to interpret the scope of 
the administrative exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Though the Court did not 
explicitly address the application of transferor versus transferee circuit law in certifying the seven 
state law classes under FLSA, it exclusively applied transferee Ninth Circuit precedent in interpret-
ing and applying the standard for Rule 23 class certification.  Id. 
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the principle of comity and voluntarily defers to the transferor courts, 
which is where the cases will be returned for trial.  The latter follows the 
principle of unitary law and takes encouragement from the fact that ap-
plying the law of one jurisdiction is efficient. 
V.  BOTH THE UNITARY LAW APPROACH AND THE COMITY APPROACH 
HAVE MAJOR FLAWS 
Both the comity and unitary law approaches to the class certifica-
tion choice-of-law question suffer from intractable flaws.  This Part dis-
cusses how neither of these approaches adequately address the choice-of-
law question for class certification in MDL proceedings. 
A.  The Unitary Law Approach’s Flaws 
Transferee courts that interpret class certification under their own 
circuits’ laws have justified doing so under the principle of unitary law 
because it fosters consistency and efficiency.  However, in some cases, 
the unitary law approach may produce inefficient or arguably unfair re-
sults.  Specifically, the unitary law approach has two major flaws: (1) 
there are limits to the law-of-the-case doctrine that the unitary law ap-
proach relies on, especially when constitutional concerns arise, and those 
limitations may lead transferor courts to reverse the transferee court’s 
class certification decision upon remand; and (2) the change of forum 
may have a significant impact on the parties’ rights and the outcome of 
the litigation. 
1.  Limits of the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine 
The unitary law approach’s primary failure is that it does not take 
into account the limits of the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Critical of the 
unitary law approach, the MTBE I court noted that the transferor court 
will regain control of the case at trial and it “would be neither just nor 
efficient” to apply the law of the transferee circuit “in considering class 
certification, and then force the transferor court to try a class action that 
it might never have certified.”96  Following the principle of unitary law, 
the Live Concert case attempted to counter this argument by pointing out 
that the principle of the “law of the case” would cure that problem—for 
example, it does not matter if the transferor court might not have certi-
                                                 
 96. MTBE I, 241 F.R.D. 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
2010] Comity Versus Unitary Law: A Clash of Principles 379 
fied the class because the transferor court is bound by the transferee 
court’s decision when the cases are remanded for trial.97 
This unitary law counter argument only goes so far, however.  The 
law-of-the-case doctrine—the doctrine limiting re-litigation of a decision 
in the same case—is discretionary in nature.98  In other words, the law-
of-the-case doctrine does not strictly limit a court’s power to revisit an 
issue.  Indeed, 
[w]hen a court applies the law of the case doctrine to its own prior 
decisions (or those of a coordinate or equal court), the traditional 
formulations of the doctrine must be conceived as rules of thumb 
and not as straightjackets on the informed discretion and sound 
practical judgment of the judge.99 
The law-of-the-case doctrine is also limited in that district courts 
“owe obedience to the court of appeals in the circuit in which they sit.  If 
the law in the transferor circuit differs from that in the transferee circuit 
where class certification was originally decided, the transferor court will 
invite reversal by upholding the law of the case.”100  Importantly, the 
law-of-the-case doctrine has no effect on the court of appeals, which can 
review issues arising in the district court without any restrictions.101  
Thus, a transferor district court to which a case is remanded for trial may 
be loathe to abide by the law of the case for fear that it will waste its time 
                                                 
 97. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 105 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 98. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 2000); First Union Bank v. Pictet 
Overseas Trust Corp., 477 F.3d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 99. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 134.21[1] (3d ed. 1999) 
(citing Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 607 (2d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Dunbar, 
357 F.3d 582, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2004); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp, 486 U.S. 800, 
817 (1998). 
 100. MOORE’S at ¶ 134.21[1]. 
 101. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816; McMasters v. United States, 260 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 
2001).  In McMasters, the Central District of California ruled that service of process on the United 
States was effective even though no attempt had been made to serve the United States Attorney.  The 
case was then transferred to the Northern District of Illinois under a § 1404(a) transfer.  The transfe-
ree court then dismissed the action for insufficient service of process.  The Seventh Circuit held that 
the law-of-the-case doctrine generally requires a court after transfer to refrain from reopening rulings 
made before transfer, but allows reconsideration to correct clear error.  On appeal, moreover, the 
law-of-the-case constraints that apply between trial courts evaporate: the question for the appellate 
court is to identify the correct rule of law.  Even if the Ninth Circuit would hold the service effective, 
the Seventh Circuit indicated that it must nonetheless apply its own view of the correct answer to a 
question of federal law because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended to be geo-
graphically non-uniform.  Id. 
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with a trial only to have its circuit court reverse the class certification 
decision.102 
The unitary law approach, which relies on the law-of-the-case doc-
trine, is also ill-equipped to deal with constitutional law dilemmas that 
may arise upon remand.  Class certification issues are sometimes inex-
tricably tied to fundamental principles of due process, the right to a trial 
by a jury, and the Rules Enabling Act,103 which makes adherence to the 
law of the case in the class action context more problematic than in some 
other areas of the law that do not implicate such fundamental issues.  For 
example, there is currently a split in authority regarding whether the doc-
trine of fluid recovery may be applied to alleviate individualized ques-
tions of causation, injury-in-fact, and damages.104  Some circuits, includ-
ing the Second Circuit, have flatly rejected the doctrine of fluid recovery 
as a violation of due process and the Rules Enabling Act.105  Other 
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have indicated that fluid recovery 
might be appropriate when “the use of such a mechanism is consistent 
with the policy or policies reflected by the statute violated.”106  This cir-
cuit split highlights a potential dilemma for a transferor court. 
To bring this dilemma into perspective, consider a theoretical case 
filed in the District of Vermont (in the Second Circuit) that is transferred 
via the MDL procedure to the Southern District of Illinois (in the Se-
venth Circuit).  If the transferee court applies the law of its own circuit, it 
might certify a class action after determining that a fluid recovery would 
be appropriate under the circumstances of the case.  If the case is then 
remanded back to the District of Vermont, that court will be faced with a 
choice: follow the law of the case, which would render an unconstitu-
tional result under Second Circuit law, or follow its own circuit’s law 
                                                 
 102. See, e.g., In re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (J.P.M.L. 2000) 
(the circuit court with jurisdiction over the district court of origin has the “power and authority to 
review any and all rulings made in the case, without regard to whether those rulings were made by 
the transferee court or the transferor court”); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2006) (A 
transferee court’s “previously unreviewed rulings are properly raised in the court of appeals for the 
transferor district should the case reach a final judgment there.”). 
 103. The Rules Enabling Act provides that federal rules of procedure, such as Rule 23, cannot 
be used to “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2008). 
 104. Under the doctrine of fluid recovery, “the jury determines the aggregate damage to the 
class without deciding how much each individual class member is to receive.  Allocation of the 
award is made later, administratively, upon the submission of claims, and often according to formu-
la.”  In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sale Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 112 (D. Mass. 2007) (quoting In 
re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 127, 143 (D. Me. 2006)). 
 105. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 106. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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and decertify the class.  Presumably, the transferor court would opt for 
the latter approach and uphold its oath to “support and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States.”107  Thus, the unitary law approach is flawed 
because it relies on the potentially incorrect assumption that the transfe-
ror court will abide by the transferee court’s class certification decision 
under the law-of-the-case doctrine.  To the extent that the transferor court 
does not abide by the transferee court’s previous decision and instead 
applies its own law to decertify the class, then the unitary law approach 
would, in that circumstance, work less efficiently than the comity ap-
proach. 
Within the class certification context, Rule 23’s text appears to in-
vite a court to revisit class certification decisions and thus further wea-
kens the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(c)(1)(C) provides that “[a]n order that grants or denies 
class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”  In 
other words, the rule itself provides the trial court flexibility to change its 
mind or alter its certification order at any time prior to judgment.  There-
fore, after a court remands a case for trial, it is inconsistent with Rule 
23(c)(1)(C) to require the transferor court to blindly abide by the class 
certification ruling of the transferee court under the law-of-the-case doc-
trine, particularly when the transferee court could have freely altered the 
order at any time if the case had not been transferred.108 
2.  A Venue Change May Impact the Litigation’s Outcome 
At least with respect to issues of state law, it is well established that 
when a case transfers from one district court to another, the transfer is 
but a change of forum and should not impact the rights of the parties.109  
However, when the law of the transferee court governs the class certifi-
cation decision, a court operating under the unitary law approach will 
                                                 
 107. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2009). 
 108. In In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 696 F.2d 613, 616–18 (8th Cir. 
1982), after a district judge in the District of Minnesota three times denied a motion to certify an 
antitrust plaintiff class, courts transferred two other actions filed in other districts to the District of 
Minnesota under the MDL procedure for consolidated pretrial proceedings.  A district judge from 
Pennsylvania was designated to conduct the proceedings, and granted certification of the class.  The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals initially issued mandamus to set aside the class certification.  It 
noted that a judge ordinarily should not set aside prior rulings by another judge in the same case 
without good cause and concluded that class certification should require some showing of changed 
law or facts.  Id.  Thereafter, however, the court of appeals voted en banc to deny the petition for 
mandamus, without opinion.  In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 705 F.2d 980 
(8th Cir. 1983). 
 109. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 632 (1964).  See also supra Part III.A. 
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apply its own circuit’s class certification law.  Thus, the transfer from 
one district court to another may significantly impact whether the court 
certifies a class. 
Thus far, the Panel has not addressed this important topic.  In a sim-
ilar context, however, the Panel expressly refused to address the choice-
of-law issue.  In In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Securities 
Litigation, a plaintiff had been conditionally transferred to another dis-
trict for multidistrict proceedings.  The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully to 
the Panel that a transfer could expose its case to dismissal because the 
transferee court would apply the statute of limitations law of the transfe-
ree circuit rather than the transferor circuit.110  Rejecting the argument, 
the Panel stated, “[W]hen determining whether to transfer an action un-
der Section 1407 . . . it is not the business of the Panel to consider what 
law the transferee court might apply.”111  The fact remains, however, that 
transferring a case to a district that intends to apply its own circuit’s law 
to the Rule 23 inquiry can dramatically affect the outcome of the case 
depending on how “plaintiff friendly” the circuit is on class certification 
issues.112 
B.  The Comity Approach’s Flaws 
Although there are significant flaws associated with applying the 
unitary law approach, the comity approach, which applies the laws of the 
transferor circuit or circuits, suffers from major problems as well.  The 
chief problems with the comity approach are that it requires district 
courts to shun their own circuit’s precedent, invites potentially inconsis-
tent decisions within the same case, and leads to inefficiency. 
1.  Rejecting Controlling Precedent 
One of the comity approach’s biggest problems is that it offends the 
fundamental premise that a court should not make a decision that it be-
lieves is wrong.  It is one thing for a district court to abide by controlling 
precedent with which it disagrees under the doctrine of stare decisis, be-
cause that principle serves as an invaluable stabilizing feature of our 
judicial system.  However, it is wholly different for a district court to 
shun the law of its own circuit in deference to a circuit court to which it 
                                                 
 110. In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (J.P.M.L. 
1988). 
 111. Id. 
 112. The discussion above provides a ready example with respect to the circuit split on the 
doctrine of fluid recovery.  See supra Part V.A.1. 
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owes no obedience.  Ultimately, as aptly stated by the court in Korean 
Air Lines, it would be “inherently self-contradictory” and “logically in-
consistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and 
conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal 
law.”113 
In the same vein, there are significant limitations to a transferee 
court’s deference to the transferor courts, many of which mirror the limi-
tations of the law-of-the-case doctrine described above.  For example, 
what if a transferee court determines that the transferor court’s circuit 
would apply a construction of Rule 23 deemed unconstitutional under its 
own circuit’s law?  Should the transferee court nevertheless apply that 
unconstitutional law because it believes the transferor court will do so 
upon remand?  A district court should not play accomplice to a constitu-
tional violation.  A court faced with such a dilemma should apply its own 
law and uphold the constitution as interpreted by its circuit.114  Efficiency 
must yield to constitutional concerns. 
2.  An Invitation to Inconsistent Decisions 
Another significant flaw of the comity approach is that it invites in-
consistent rulings in the same case.  If the transferee court must apply 
different circuits’ precedent to the Rule 23 decision, inconsistent rulings 
may result.  The Wal-Mart case described above provides a helpful ex-
ample.115  In that case, the district court, following the comity approach, 
noted that there is a circuit split regarding which test to apply to deter-
mine the appropriateness of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.116  The Wal-Mart court 
ultimately concluded that under the specific facts at issue, a Rule 
23(b)(2) class would not be appropriate under any circuit’s test.117  If the 
facts had been different, however, the court may have decided that it 
needed to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class in some of the cases, but not oth-
ers, simply because it was using inconsistent tests under different cir-
cuits’ precedent.  As noted in Korean Air Lines, this conflicting result 
                                                 
 113. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175–76 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 114. See discussion of MTBE I, supra note 60, and accompanying text.  The court in MTBE I 
did not have occasion to address whether deference to the transferor courts has limitations, but pre-
sumably the transferee district court would have misgivings about playing accomplice to a constitu-
tional violation. 
 115. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-
PAL, 2008 WL 3179315, at *1 (D. Nev. June 20, 2008).  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at *16. 
384 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:2 
would be “logically inconsistent.”118  It would also be “difficult to ex-
plain the rationality of such divergences to the lay persons served by the 
federal judicial system.”119 
3.  The Comity Approach’s Inefficiency 
The final problem with applying the transferor court’s law is a prac-
tical one: it reduces the efficiency of the MDL process.  A transferee 
court already faces extreme difficulty applying the substantive laws of all 
of the underlying states in a multi-state MDL proceeding.  If the court 
must also apply varying interpretations of Rule 23 based on the original 
location of the cases, the class certification process could bog down tre-
mendously.  Not uncommonly, the transferee district court would have to 
consider the laws of half a dozen or more circuits because MDL proceed-
ings often include cases pending across the United States.  The MDL 
procedure’s goals of increasing efficiency and eliminating confusion120 
might be significantly impaired if the district court must navigate through 
a maze of potentially conflicting class certification rules.  Requiring a 
transferee court to apply the laws of all the transferor circuits also in-
creases the likelihood that the transferee court might improperly interpret 
the law, both because the transferee court has less familiarity with other 
circuits’ laws and because there are simply too many cases and wrinkles 
in the law between circuits for the district court to capture every nuance. 
The judiciary’s desire for efficiency, perhaps more than any other 
factor, will motivate many district courts to find a justification for apply-
ing one circuit’s law, and preferably its own.  As one commentator put it: 
The transfer provisions would, however, be impaired substantially 
by insisting upon adherence to transferor interpretation.  Transferee 
judges would be burdened with the difficult task of divining the atti-
tude of the transferor circuit; such adherence would present new 
problems in distinguishing between “substantive” matters, which 
are governed by transferor interpretation, and “procedural” matters, 
which are not; and consolidated treatment of transferred cases 
would become more difficult or perhaps impossible.  In this day of 
escalating caseloads it is foolish to weaken the transfer devices, 
which attempt to utilize the unified federal judicial system to relieve 
                                                 
 118. Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175–76. 
 119. Id. at 1176 n.8. 
 120. The MDL transfer rules are designed to eliminate “delay, confusion, conflict, inordinate 
expense and inefficiency” during the pretrial period.  In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 
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part of the burden on the courts.  The courts should therefore recog-
nize that the transferee court must be free to decide a federal claim 
in the manner it views as correct without deferring to the interpreta-
tion of the transferor circuit.121 
In summary, the current MDL remand procedure leads to two high-
ly flawed approaches to the choice-of-law issue.  Neither the comity ap-
proach nor the unitary law approach supplies an adequate answer to the 
choice-of-law question: either the transferee district court abides by its 
own circuit’s law and runs the risk that the transferor district court or 
circuit will overturn the decision, or it makes a determination that may be 
incorrect under its own circuit’s precedent to avoid a problem upon re-
mand. 
VI.  A THIRD OPTION: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
So which path is best?  The above analysis of these two flawed ap-
proaches ultimately shows that neither presents a viable solution.  A third 
option, however, offers a solution to nearly all of the shortcomings pre-
sented by the comity and unitary law approaches: Congress should simp-
ly enact legislation that allows transferee courts under the MDL process 
to keep the transferred cases for trial.  Indeed, as described below, both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate repeatedly examined the 
problems of Lexecon and its remand obligation, but ultimately failed to 
pass the necessary legislation.  This Part describes a solution to remedy 
the choice-of-law dilemma for class certification in MDL cases and the 
necessary congressional action. 
A.  The Solution 
The best available option to solve nearly all of the problems asso-
ciated with the comity and unitary law approaches is to eliminate the re-
mand requirement mandated by § 1407.  If the transferee court can keep 
the cases for trial, then the law-of-the-case problems described above 
disappear because the transferor courts will not regain control of the cas-
es, and therefore will not need to examine the class certification deci-
sions.  Nor will the transferee court need to worry that a transferor court 
may later reverse the class certification decision because the transferor 
court will never have occasion to consider the appropriateness of the cer-
tification decision. 
                                                 
 121. Marcus, supra note 95, at 721. 
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Allowing the transferee court to keep the cases for trial would also 
increase efficiency.  Prior to Lexecon, transferee courts would routinely 
transfer the cases to themselves for trial purposes.122  This procedure al-
lowed the transferee courts to efficiently handle not only pre-trial pro-
ceedings, but also trials of multiple cases presenting similar issues.  As 
the Manual for Complex Litigation explains, self-transfer to the transfe-
ree court has several efficiencies: 
(1) during the often protracted time of the section 1407 assignment, 
the transferee judge gains a solid understanding of the case, and it 
makes sense for trial to be conducted by the judge with the greatest 
understanding of the litigation; (2) the transferee judge may already 
be trying the constituent centralized action(s), and there may be ef-
ficiencies in adjudicating related actions or portions thereof in one 
trial; and (3) the transferee judge, if empowered to try the centra-
lized actions, may have a greater ability to facilitate a global settle-
ment.123 
One can add to this list the efficiency gained by allowing the transferee 
court to apply a single circuit’s law in deciding class certification. 
Eliminating § 1407’s remand requirement would also ensure con-
sistent results within the same MDL action.  As described above, a trans-
feree court that applies the comity approach may need to consider con-
flicting Rule 23 precedent of multiple circuit courts, which may cause it 
to grant class certification to some of the cases, but not others.  This 
would produce a counterproductive result given that the MDL procedure 
is designed to eliminate conflict, not facilitate it.124  If, however, the 
transferee court keeps the cases for trial, the transferee court can safely 
apply its own circuit’s law and achieve a consistent decision on class 
certification. 
One potential drawback under the current system remains uncured 
by eliminating the remand procedure: a transfer from one jurisdiction to 
another may alter the outcome of the litigation.  A transfer from one dis-
trict court to another with controlling case law that is more beneficial to 
one party creates the possibility that the transfer may be case determina-
tive.  Of course, as described in Part III.B., that issue already exists in 
MDL cases in connection with pretrial proceedings, such as motions to 
dismiss and summary judgment, because the transferee courts apply their 
                                                 
 122. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.132 (2009). 
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 124. Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. at 491–92 (explaining that elimination of conflict is 
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own circuits’ law.  Indeed, even the MTBE I court, which championed 
the comity approach described above, applied the law of the transferee 
court in examining a motion to dismiss.125  Thus, the current system al-
ready tolerates the reality that transfer under the MDL procedure may 
cause a change in applicable federal precedent that may impact the result 
of the litigation. 
Further, the principle that the plaintiff should be able to choose its 
forum only goes so far in federal court.  Even under the current MDL 
procedure, a transferor court can transfer a case to the transferee court for 
all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).126  Moreover, as noted by the 
Korean Air Lines court, “[t]he point has been cogently made that venue 
provisions are designed with geographical convenience in mind, and not 
to ‘guarantee that the plaintiff will be able to select the law that will go-
vern the case.’”127  The Korean Air Lines court added that 
[t]he federal courts comprise a single system [in which each tribunal 
endeavors to apply] a single body of law; there is no compelling 
reason to allow plaintiff to capture the most favorable interpretation 
of that law simply and solely by virtue of his or her right to choose 
the place to open the fray.128 
As long as the Panel does not consider choice-of-law issues in de-
ciding where to transfer cases, it is difficult to maintain that the Panel 
favors either party through the MDL process.  Indeed, the plaintiff may 
even benefit by the MDL transfer if the transferee court uses its own cir-
cuit’s law in making the class certification decision.  The transferee cir-
cuit’s law may be more “plaintiff friendly” than the transferor circuit’s 
law.  In fact, the plaintiff may have preferred to file the complaint in the 
transferee court in the first instance if he had not been precluded from 
doing so by venue considerations.  Thus, although a real concern exists 
that the MDL transfer may impact the outcome of the litigation, it is an 
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acceptable cost because the Panel can remain impartial on this issue,129 
and the risk is fairly evenly distributed to both sides in the lawsuit. 
B.  Congressional Action 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Lexecon, “the proper venue for 
resolving [the MDL remand procedure] remains the floor of Con-
gress.”130  Shortly after the Court issued the Lexecon decision, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States requested that Congress eliminate 
§ 1407’s remand requirement to allow the transferee courts to self-
transfer cases.131  United States District Court Judge John F. Nangle, 
former Chairman of the Panel, testified before the House Subcommittee 
on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary and 
called the MDL remand requirement “a cumbersome, repetitive, costly, 
potentially inconsistent, time consuming, inefficient and wasteful utiliza-
tion of judicial and litigants’ resources.”132  Similarly, United States Dis-
trict Judge William T. Hodges, another former Chairman of the Panel, 
told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that eliminating § 1407’s remand 
requirement is imperative to facilitate settlements, reduce waste of judi-
cial resources, and reduce the uncertainties, delay, and expense that par-
ties may experience due to unnecessary duplication of litigation or incon-
sistent results in different jurisdictions.133 
Both Houses of Congress considered eliminating Lexecon’s remand 
requirement.  Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), for example, suggested that 
eliminating § 1407’s remand requirement would “provide the MDL Pan-
el with the most efficient option for resolving complex issues, the best 
means to encourage universal settlements, and the most consistent ap-
proach for rendering decisions.”134  The House135 and the Senate136 pro-
                                                 
 129. In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (J.P.M.L. 
1988) (noting that the Panel will not consider choice-of-law issues in determining to which district to 
transfer cases). 
 130. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998). 
 131. Marcia Coyle, Bill to Fix ‘Lexecon’ Sought in Congress, Issue is Handling of Multidistrict 
Cases, NAT’L L.J., Jul. 10, 2006, at 1, 18. 
 132. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1752 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. 56 (1999) (statement of Judge John F. Nangle, 
Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdic-
tion Act of 1999: Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 56 (1999) (statement of Judge 
John F. Nangle, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). 
 133. Coyle, supra note 131, at 18. 
 134. 152 CONG. REC. S8272–73 (daily ed. July 26, 2006). 
 135. The Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), was passed in the 
House and would have eliminated the § 1407 remand requirement, but it died in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), in 144 CONG. REC. S3585 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 
 
2010] Comity Versus Unitary Law: A Clash of Principles 389 
posed legislation multiple times that would amend § 1407 to allow trans-
feree courts to retain the cases for trial.  Ultimately, however, the legisla-
tion repeatedly languished in committees and died.137  On the available 
record, it is difficult to know whether the legislation failed because Con-
gress lacks interest in this issue or if lobbying efforts successfully 
thwarted the legislation’s enactment.  The sheer number of times pro-
posed legislation has been introduced on this issue makes the former ex-
planation unlikely.  The record, however, does not reflect lobbying, and 
we are left to speculate why Congress cannot synchronize its efforts to 
enact the necessary legislation.  Until it does, courts will be required to 
weigh the principles of comity and unitary law in their choice-of-law 
analysis for class certification decisions in MDL cases, and the result of 
that weighing process will produce flawed results. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The current MDL remand procedure creates a choice-of-law battle 
for class certification that pits the principle of comity against the prin-
ciple of unitary federal law.  Because these are principles central to the 
United States’ judicial system, it comes as no surprise that courts have 
struggled with and disagreed on which principle prevails when the two 
conflict.  But this philosophical battle is a needless war that can be easily 
ended by changing the MDL rules to allow the transferee court to retain 
the transferred cases for trial.  The courts, however, cannot spontaneous-
ly decide to implement a change; instead, Congress needs to act to elimi-
nate the MDL remand procedure.  Until Congress changes the law, 
courts examining choice-of-law for class certification in MDL cases will 
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find themselves in a difficult position with no satisfactory approach in 
sight. 
